Over the past four decades, government debt as a fraction of GDP has been on an upward trajectory in advanced economies, approaching levels not reached since World War II. While normative macroeconomic theories can explain the increase in the level of debt in certain periods as a response to macroeconomic shocks, they cannot explain the broad-based long-run trend in debt accumulation. In contrast, political economy theories can explain the long-run trend as resulting from an aging population, rising political polarization, and rising electoral uncertainty across advanced economies. These theories emphasize the time-inconsistency in government policymaking, and thus the need for …scal rules that restrict policymakers. Fiscal rules trade o¤ commitment to not overspend and ‡exibility to react to shocks. This tradeo¤ guides design features of optimal rules, such as information dependence, enforcement, cross-country coordination, escape clauses, and instrument vs. target criteria.
Introduction
Since reaching a trough in the mid-1970s, U.S. government debt as a fraction of GDP has been on an upward trajectory, approaching levels not reached since World War II. As Figure 1 illustrates, the government debt increase in World War II, as in other wars, was only temporary; the post-war reduction in defense spending facilitated its repayment.
1;2 In contrast, the more recent increase in government debt re ‡ects a long-term …scal imbalance. Figure 2 shows that recent decades have been marked by large gaps between government spending and revenue. This is largely the result of a secular expansion of government spending-in particular, mandatory spending programs such as social security, medicare, and medicaid-and an inability for tax revenue to rise as rapidly.
3 Figure 1 . Government Debt in the U.S. 1 The government debt to GDP ratio is projected to continue to increase signi…cantly over the coming decade (Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2018, Table 4 .1).
2 Throughout this paper, I focus on gross central government debt, since this measure is available for the broadest cross-section of advanced economies. All empirical observations are robust to replacing this gross measure with federal debt held by the public for the case of the U.S.
3 See Blahous (2013) for a discussion of the impact of mandatory spending programs on rising government debt. Mandatory spending relative to GDP increased from 1970 onward, with a rapid acceleration between 1970 and the mid-1980s. Discretionary spending relative to GDP steadily declined from 1970 to 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, it increased (though remaining well below historical levels) and has been decreasing since 2010. See Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2018) . The U.S. is not alone. Almost every single advanced economy has experienced a longterm increase in government debt to GDP, including France and Germany; see Figure 3 . The increase in government debt in most of these countries is the result of tax revenue not keeping pace with the expansion of government spending, as in the case of the U.S. 4 In addition, across advanced economies, o¤-balance-sheet government liabilities, such as future government commitments to the old, have grown substantially. 5 Debt buildups of the magnitude shown in Figure 3 can eventually lead to diminished economic activity, either by crowding out private capital investment or by forcing an increase in distortive taxes and decrease in public investment to facilitate repayment. 6 Moreover, a government carrying such a high debt load may be constrained in responding to future catastrophes, such as …nancial crises, natural disasters, or wars. 7 In extreme 4 For example, between 1965 and 2016, general government tax revenue as a share of GDP increased in France and Germany and in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) more broadly (see OECD "Revenue Statistics").
5 Hamilton (2014) estimates that in 2012, o¤-balance-sheet U.S. federal debt was six times the size of on-balance-sheet debt. More than three quarters of this o¤-balance-sheet debt was accounted for by future social security and medicare obligations (see Hamilton, 2014, Table 5 ). The European Central Bank (2011, Tables 4 and 11) estimates that in 2007, future pension entitlements in the Euro area were …ve times the size of on-balance-sheet debt. 6 For an analysis of the empirical relationship between economic growth and public debt, see Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogo¤ (2012) and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) . Boskin, et al. (2018) assess the risks of rising debt in the U.S. 7 For a discussion of this constraining e¤ect of higher public debt, see Obstfeld (2013) , Battaglini and cases, the result is default through explicit debt repudiation or in ‡ation.
Figure 3. Government Debt in Advanced Economies
Could the costs of increased government debt-however large or small-be justi…ed? Has the rise in government debt over the past four decades served a socially bene…cial purpose that would compensate for the added debt burden? In the …rst part of this article, I review normative macroeconomic theories in which government debt serves three possible functions: it can facilitate tax-smoothing, provide a safe asset, or sustain dynamic e¢ ciency. I argue that, while the increase in the level of debt in certain periods may have been an optimal response to speci…c macroeconomic shocks, such as the global …nancial crisis, the broad-based long-run trend in debt accumulation seems inconsistent with optimal policy. 9 Motivated by this observation, I proceed in the second part of this article by reviewing political economy theories of government debt. These theories predict that the presence of an aging population, political polarization, and electoral uncertainty cause governments , and Romer and Romer (2017) , among others. 8 There are many historical cases of default in advanced economies (e.g., Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogo¤, 2015) . The costs of default include increased stress on …nancial institutions, lower international …nancing for …rms, and decreased export market access. For a discussion, see Borensztein and Panizza (2008) , Tomz and Wright (2013) , and Hébert and Schreger (2017) , among others. 9 Declining interest rates due to global imbalances after the Asian …nancial crisis of 1997 is another force which could have increased the optimal level of public debt, depending on the relative importance of di¤erent economic channels.
to be shortsighted and to promote immediate goals at the expense of long-term ones. These political factors a¤ect the long-run size of government de…cits and therefore the long-term trajectory of government debt. I argue that an increasingly older population, rising political polarization, and rising electoral uncertainty can explain the long-run trend in government debt across advanced economies.
A resonating theme across all the political explanations for rising debt is the timeinconsistency of government policy. Current governments want to be …scally irresponsible, while simultaneously hoping that future governments be …scally responsible. This force explains why governments across the world have been compelled to adopt …scal rulessuch as mandated de…cit, spending, or revenue limits-to restrict future …scal policy and curtail the increase in government debt. In 2015, 92 countries had …scal rules in place, a dramatic increase from 1990, when only 7 countries had them. 10 In some countries, these rules have been an e¤ective force at limiting the de…cit bias of governments and curbing the increase in debt.
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Given their prevalence, an important question concerns the optimal structure of …scal rules, as well as the practical challenges to their implementation. In the …nal part of this article, I describe some of the recent research on the optimal design of …scal rules, elucidating the fundamental tradeo¤ between commitment and ‡exibility underpinning these rules. I also consider what this tradeo¤ implies for various features of …scal rules in theory and in practice. This discussion touches on how rules should be conditioned on public information, how they should be enforced, how they should be applied at a supranational level, whether they should feature escape clauses, and whether they should be based on …scal policy tools or targets.
Rising Government Debt vs. Optimal Policy
Is rising government debt in advanced economies like the U.S. a re ‡ection of optimal policy? In this section, I review theories of optimal government debt, and I argue that the answer to this question appears to be no. While the increase in the level of debt in certain periods may have been an optimal response to speci…c macroeconomic shocks, the broad-based long-run trend in debt accumulation seems inconsistent with optimal policy.
How Government Debt Matters
Behind any theory of optimal government debt is an assumption to break the Ricardian Equivalence proposition (Barro, 1974) . This proposition states that the level of government debt is irrelevant and has no e¤ect on real economic activity. Speci…cally, if the government cuts taxes and borrows today, the private sector anticipates a tax increase in the future by the government to repay the debt. As a consequence, consumption, labor, and capital investment decisions are unchanged since the private sector uses the tax cut today to save through government bonds to …nance a higher future tax burden.
The logic of Ricardian Equivalence requires three strong conditions that do not hold in practice. First, it assumes that raising revenue entails no deadweight loss, which is why the timing of revenue-raising does not directly distort consumption, labor, or capital investment decisions. Second, households and …rms are assumed to be …nancially unconstrained and can thus borrow and lend freely at the same terms as the government. This is why a borrowing entity does not bene…t from the additional liquidity it receives from a tax cut. Finally, households and …rms care about the level of taxes in…nitely far into the future, which is why they internalize the future tax liability associated with current tax cuts. I now turn to theories of optimal government debt that relax each of these three conditions.
Tax-Smoothing
The most widely used theory of optimal government debt management is the tax-smoothing theory. If raising revenue distorts economic decisions, whereas selling government bonds does not, then government debt allows the government to smooth the deadweight loss from raising revenue across time (e.g., Barro, 1979, Lucas and Stokey, 1983) .
12,13 According to this theory, there are a number of economic forces that drive optimal government debt upward or downward. I now examine whether this theory of optimal policy can justify the observed long-run trend in government debt in advanced economies. 12 One can introduce such a deadweight loss in a production economy by ruling out lump sum taxes. This implies that raising revenue through distortionary taxes changes the level, and potentially the distribution, of economic allocations.
13 For follow-up work which builds on this tradition, see Bohn (1990) , Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) , Aiyagari, et al. (2002) , Angeletos (2002) , Buera and Nicolini (2004) , Werning (2007) , Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2008), Faraglia, Marcet, and Scott (2010) , Farhi (2010 ), Bhandari, et al. (2017a , and Karantounias (2018) , among others.
Unanticipated Fiscal Needs
The tax-smoothing argument suggests that a government facing temporary and unanticipated spending needs should respond optimally by increasing government debt. The logic is that …nancing these needs through immediate revenue-raising would be too costly for the economy in the short-term; it is better to issue debt to spread these costs into the future, when …scal needs are lower. There are several unanticipated temporary …scal needs that have caused government debt to increase across advanced economies.
The global …nancial crisis, which started in 2007, increased the …scal needs of governments. It put downward pressure on government revenues and upward pressure on the potential bene…ts of …scal stimulus, which some countries pursued through temporary tax cuts and government spending increases.
14 Government debt across advanced economies increased in response. In the U.S., gross central government debt as a fraction of GDP increased from 64 percent in 2007 to 90 percent in 2010. During the same time frame, government debt to GDP in the Euro area also increased, not only in countries heavily impacted by the crisis such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but also in countries less impacted by the crisis such as Germany and France.
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Nevertheless, the global …nancial crisis alone cannot explain the secular increase in government debt across advanced economies, as this trend goes back several decades. In 1980, U.S. government debt was about one half the pre-crisis 2007 level. In France and Germany, government debt to GDP was approximately one third the 2007 level.
Prior to the global …nancial crisis, the unanticipated wars in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003 Iraq ( -2011 contributed to rising government debt. In the U.S., military spending as a fraction of GDP increased from 2.9 percent in 2000 to 3.8 percent in 2007, and government debt to GDP increased from 57 percent to 64 percent. 16 However, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot account for the increase in U.S. government debt to GDP from 33 percent in 1980 to 57 percent in 2000. This was a period during which the end of the Cold War brought along a signi…cant unanticipated decrease in military spending, a force that should have caused government debt to decline, but did not (e.g., Alesina, 2000) . In addition, these wars cannot account for the increase in government debt in other advanced economies. For example, military spending relative to GDP actually decreased between 2000 and 2007 in the Euro area as a whole, including 14 See Ramey (2011) and the references therein for a discussion of the empirical evidence on the bene…t of …scal stimulus measures. 15 All measures of gross central government debt to GDP are from Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011 In sum, unanticipated temporary …scal needs resulting from the global …nancial crisis and war can explain the increase in the level of debt in certain periods, but they cannot explain the long-term trend in government debt across advanced economies.
Anticipated Fiscal Needs
A question then emerges as to whether anticipated …scal needs can explain the longterm trend in public debt. According to tax-smoothing theory, a government facing a reduction in long-term …scal needs should increase public debt in the present. This is because declining …scal pressures can facilitate future debt repayment.
The long-term anticipated …scal needs of advanced economies have actually evolved in the exact opposite direction. Across advanced economies, the reduction in fertility rates and the extension of life spans have gradually increased the fraction of the population which is old, as displayed in Figure 4 . The result is higher dependency ratios and larger old-age government assistance programs. 19 In the U.S., for example, social security spending as a fraction of GDP increased from 2.8 percent of GDP in 1970 to 4.9 percent of GDP in 2017. Medicare spending as a fraction of GDP increased from 0.6 percent of GDP to 3.7 percent of GDP during that time. 20 These are forecasted to continue to rise over the coming decade.
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In the face of these anticipated demographic changes, tax-smoothing theory would have prescribed a decumulation-not an accumulation-of government debt during the past several decades. A government facing rising future …scal pressures should pay down a larger portion of the debt in the present so as to alleviate forecasted …scal strain. Moreover, tax-smoothing theory would have predicted lower debt accumulation in countries anticipating greater strain due to an aging population. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional 17 Military spending decreased in the Euro area from 1.9 percent to 1.7 percent of GDP. In Germany, the decline was from 1.4 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP. In France, the decline was from 2.5 percent to 2.2 percent of GDP. 18 In Germany, government debt increased from 35 percent to 39 percent of GDP. In France, government debt increased from 57 percent to 64 percent of GDP.
19 For example, between 1975 and , the dependency ratio in the OECD increased from 19.5 to 27.9 (OECD, 2017, Table 5 .5). Between 1980 and 2013, cash bene…ts to the elderly as a fraction of GDP increased from 5.7 percent to 8.2 percent (OECD "Social Expenditure Database"). 20 Data from Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2018) . This increase in mandatory spending was anticipated by historical U.S. government forecasts which, on average, predicted larger increases than were realized (see Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2017) . 21 Social security spending is projected to increase to 6.0 percent of GDP and medicare spending to 5.1 percent of GDP by 2028 (Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2018, data illustrated in Figure 5 shows the opposite: Countries experiencing a greater increase in population aging, like Japan, actually accumulated more debt as a percentage of GDP than those experiencing a lower demographic strain, such as Denmark.
In sum, the long-term secular trend in government debt accumulation across advanced economies cannot re ‡ect an optimal policy response to anticipated …scal needs. 
Safe Asset Provision
A second theory of optimal government debt considers the role of public debt when the private sector is …nancially constrained and cannot borrow or lend freely at the same terms as the government (e.g., Woodford, 1990 , Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998 , Holmström and Tirole, 1998 . 22 This theory builds on the fact that, relative to private defaultable debt, government debt is less risky to hold since it is backed by future tax revenues, which the government can collect through its power of coercion. By increasing the issuance of government bonds, the government slackens …nancial constraints on borrowers who now receive additional resources from the government (through tax cuts or government loans), while simultaneously increasing the supply of safe assets available to lenders. Accordingly, the government can accommodate a change in safe asset demand or supply-which a¤ects interest rates-with an increase or decrease in government debt. I now examine whether this safe asset provision theory of optimal debt can justify the observed long-term trend in government debt in advanced economies. 
Financial Constraints
The safe asset provision theory suggests that, in the face of tightening private credit conditions, the government should respond with an increase in government debt. If …nancial constraints become tighter, an increase in public debt counteracts the shrinking supply of safe assets for creditors, while simultaneously providing more liquidity to increasingly constrained borrowers.
deregulation (e.g., Philippon and Reshef, 2012) . Deregulation came hand in hand with an increase in private sector leverage. 25 According to the safe asset provision theory, such a relaxation of …nancial constraints should have been met with a decrease, as opposed to an increase, in public debt.
Precautionary Private Savings
The safe asset provision theory also suggests that public debt should increase in response to rising income risk. Households and businesses facing greater income risk develop a stronger precautionary motive to save, driving down interest rates. The optimal policy response increases the supply of public debt to satisfy the increased demand for safe assets.
26
Nevertheless, evidence from U.S. administrative data suggests that income risk actually declined in the decades after 1980 (e.g., Sabelhaus and Song, 2010, Guvenen, Ozkhan, and Song, 2014) . 27 According to the safe asset provision theory, this development should have been met with a decrease, as opposed to an increase, in public debt.
Global Capital Flows and Interest Rates
A …nal factor which the safe asset provision theory can address is how public debt should respond to globalization. Over the last four decades, the reduction of international barriers in trade and …nance led to a dramatic expansion of cross-border ‡ows. 28 This trend accelerated in the aftermath of the Asian …nancial crisis of 1997 and the introduction of China into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The ensuing large capital in ‡ows into advanced economies-a phenomenon known as the global saving glut-led to a deterioration of net foreign asset position for some advanced economies and to a decline in global interest rates (Bernanke, 2005) .
29
What is the e¤ect of globalization on the optimal provision of public debt? How should public debt respond to larger capital in ‡ows from global saving glut countries? The answer 25 The U.S., for example, saw an increase in household debt, with household debt service as a percent of disposable income rising from 10.5 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 2007 (see Federal Reserve Board).
26 Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014) illustrate this result in a quantitative model. 27 This evidence pertains to household labor income. Business-level analyses of trends in risk have found mixed results (e.g., Campbell, et al, 2001, and Brandt, et al., 2009) . 28 For example, between 1980 and 2017, U.S. foreign assets increased from 30 percent of GDP to 144 percent of GDP while U.S. foreign liabilities increased from 19 percent of GDP to 185 percent of GDP (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "International Investment Position", Table 1 .1). 29 In the U.S., for instance, net foreign assets relative to GDP declined from -9 percent of GDP in 1997 to -41 percent of GDP in 2017 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "International Investment Position", Table 1 .1).
depends on a number of factors. First, an increase in asset demand by foreigners cheapens borrowing by the domestic private and public sectors, reducing the level of interest rates. Second, globalization expands the market for safe assets, thereby reducing the marginal interest rate response to additional public debt issuance. Finally, additional borrowing by the domestic private sector (in response to lower interest rates) means that domestic borrowers su¤er more from marginal interest rate increases induced by higher public debt. While the …rst two forces reduce the cost of issuing public debt on the margin, the third force increases this cost. As such, the optimal policy response to greater globalization and capital in ‡ows is ambiguous.
30
Beyond this theoretical ambiguity, there are other reasons why the long-term trend in public debt across advanced economies does not appear to be an optimal policy response to globalization. First, government debt in the U.S. and other advanced economies had been on an upward trajectory well before the onset of the global saving glut in the late 1990s.
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Second, prior to the late 1990s, the degree of cross-border public debt holdings had been relatively stable, suggesting that the globalization of public debt markets was limited up until that point. 32 Finally, this theory would predict that smaller countries respond to globalization by increasing public debt proportionately more than larger countries. This follows since globalization decreases the interest rate response to debt issuance by more for small countries. This prediction is also at odds with the empirical evidence. The relationship between country size and debt issuance for advanced economies during this period is actually positive, with larger economies such as Japan and the United States increasing their public debt to GDP ratio by more than other countries.
33 30 The three channels highlighted here, together with an ambiguous optimal policy response, emerge if one extends the two-period model of Azzimonti and Yared (2017) by introducing foreign asset demand (details available upon request). Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014) also illustrate the second channel in a model with symmetric countries individually choosing policy. Another approach to this question additionally considers the risk of default and in ‡ation by the government (e.g., Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2017 , Farhi and Maggiori, 2017 , He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt, 2018 . 31 See the discussion in the previous section for the case of the U.S. In Germany, government debt to GDP grew from 15 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 2000. In France, it grew from 21 percent to 57 percent. 32 For example, in the case of the U.S., the fraction of government debt which was domestically held remained around 79 percent between 1980 . Between 1994 , this fraction declined to 49 percent (see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Service). 33 As an illustration, in the advanced economy sample from Figure 3 , the change in debt to GDP from 1980 to 2010 has a correlation of 0.26 with log 1980 population and 0.23 with log 1980 GDP. Population and GDP data are from Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) .
Dynamic E¢ ciency
I have argued that neither the tax-smoothing theory nor the safe asset provision theory can deliver a justi…cation for the long-term trend in government debt accumulation across advanced economies. A …nal, less explored, theory considers the role of public debt when the private sector does not internalize the e¤ect of …scal policy in…nitely far into the future (e.g., Diamond, 1965, and Blanchard, 1985) . In such an environment, older households do not face the future tax cost of issuing government debt today, since these taxes will be repaid by future generations. As a consequence, an increase in government debt has the e¤ect of tilting the lifetime consumption pro…le towards older generations, while also increasing interest rates and crowding out capital investment. Moreover, under some conditions, the possibility of a bubble in government debt arises, whereby one generation is willing to hold government debt purely because future generations are also expected to do so.
From this perspective, if an economy is dynamically ine¢ cient and has overaccumulated capital, increasing government debt can be optimal.
34 By reducing the capital stock, a higher government debt reduces household saving and bene…ts society by increasing household lifetime consumption. However, there is no evidence of capital overaccumulation in advanced economies over the last decades. Abel, et al. (1989) examine data for the OECD from 1960 to 1985 and for the U.S. from 1929 to 1985 and …nd no dynamic ine¢ ciencies. The empirical patterns behind their conclusions also hold for the U.S. with data extended to the present. 35 This evidence suggests that the observed trend in public debt is unlikely to have been an optimal policy response to dynamic ine¢ ciency.
3 Political Forces behind Rising Government Debt
The absence of a clear normative reason for the trend in government debt across advanced economies suggests that political forces are behind this pattern. In this section, I review political economy theories of government debt. These theories predict that the presence of an aging population, political polarization, and electoral uncertainty cause governments to be shortsighted and to promote immediate goals at the expense of long-term ones. These political factors a¤ect the long-run size of government de…cits and therefore the 34 Ine¢ cient overaccumulation can emerge in equilibrium when agents have …nite horizons, in which case a bubble on government debt can improve welfare. See Shell (1971) and Geanakoplos (2008) for a discussion of ine¢ ciencies in overlapping generations economies.
35 See Geerolf (2017) , Figure 3 . 36 Geerolf (2017) revisits the conclusions of Abel el al. (1989) and argues that some OECD countries, such as Japan and South Korea, are dynamically ine¢ cient.
long-term trend of government debt. I argue that, over the past four decades, changes in these political factors can explain the long-run trajectory of government debt. 37 Theoretically, the political factors that I describe imply that a government behaves similarly to an agent with present-biased and dynamically inconsistent preferences (e.g., Strotz, 1955 ). An analytically tractable representation of such preferences is the quasihyperbolic case analyzed in Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) . 38 In the context of a …scal policy model, quasi-hyperbolic preferences imply that the government at a given date t weighs periods ft; t + 1; t + 2; :::g according to discount rates 1; ; 2 ; ::: , for some rate of time preference 2 (0; 1) and present bias 2 (0; 1). This present bias is determined by various underlying political factors.
39
Relative to the benevolent social planner, with discount rates 1; ; 2 ; ::: , these quasihyperbolic preferences feature a sharp drop in valuation after date t, capturing the present bias. Moreover, these preferences are dynamically inconsistent: The weight the government assigns to future periods depends on the perspective of the government. For example, consider the weight the government assigns to date t + 2 relative to date t + 1. From the perspective of date t, this weight is 2 = ( ) = , but from the perspective of date that persistent, broad-based changes in these political factors o¤er an explanation for the long-run trend in government debt.
41,42
Aging and Heterogeneous Discounting
Government debt is impacted by the fact that households di¤er in how much they weigh the present relative to the future. These di¤erences can be the result of demographics, with older households caring less about the future than younger households. This heterogeneity by itself does not imply excessive debt accumulation. However, in a political environment in which policy is chosen sequentially without commitment, as in a representative democracy, this heterogeneity implies a present bias together with dynamically inconsistent preferences for the government. We can illustrate this idea using a simple example based on the analysis in Yariv (2014, 2015) . Suppose that half the population has a rate of time preference H and the other half has a rate L < H , with policy chosen sequentially by a utilitarian government.
43 Individuals are time-consistent, since an individual applies discount rates 1; i ; 2 i ; ::: for i = H; L to the future. However, the utilitarian government is presentbiased and dynamically inconsistent. To see why, consider the weight the utilitarian government assigns to date t + 2 relative to date t + 1. From the perspective of date t, this weight is
Thus, the government overweighs date t + 1 when choosing policy at date t + 1 relative to what it would have preferred ex ante at date t. Note further that for the special case where L = 0, government preferences exactly coincide with the quasi-hyberbolic preferences described previously, with a rate of time preference = H and a de…cit bias = 1=2 (the fraction of patient households).
44 41 Due to space restrictions, I focus on long-run considerations and ignore variation in present bias over the political business cycle (e.g., Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988 , and Rogo¤, 1990 , Drazen, 2000 , Ales, Maziero, and Yared, 2014 . See the survey in Alesina and Passalacqua (2016) for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical literature on the political economy of public debt. 42 Note that even in the absence of the forces that I describe, government debt can deviate from the normative benchmark if a government is benevolent but lacks commitment to the path of interest rates or to repaying debt (e.g., Chari and Kehoe 1993a , 1993b , Debortoli, Nunes, and Yared, 2017 . However, whether this form of lack of commitment on its own leads to debt that is higher or lower than is optimal is ambiguous and depends on various economic considerations. For this reason, I focus on how lack of commitment combined with additional political factors leads to excessive debt. 43 This representation of sequential policymaking is equivalent to a policy chosen through dynamic elections in a probabilistic voting game (e.g., Farhi, et al., 2012) . 44 Yariv (2014, 2015) generalize this idea and show that with any heterogeneity in preferences, every nondictatorial aggregation method that respects unanimity must be time-inconsistent; moreover, any such method that is time separable must lead to a present bias.
Conceptually, heterogeneity in discount rates means that impatient households wield disproportionate in ‡uence in policymaking. If commitment were possible, impatient households would agree ex ante to allow the patient households to have more political in ‡uence in the future, since those households value the future more. However, nothing can stop impatient households from in ‡uencing policy ex post through the political process, which is why there is a present bias in policymaking, and the government is time-inconsistent.
This theory has implications for intergenerational con ‡ict and its impact on government debt. The larger is the fraction of old impatient households relative to young patient households, the more shortsighted is the government, the larger are government de…cits, and the more rapid is government debt accumulation.
45 This is consistent with survey evidence on intergenerational di¤erences in policy preferences, with younger households placing a larger value on …scal responsibility than older households.
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This theory can explain the long-term trend in government debt in advanced economies as resulting from an aging population, as displayed earlier in Figure 4 . In addition, this theory is consistent with the cross-country trends displayed earlier in Figure 5 , where government debt has grown faster in countries experiencing a larger increase in the elderly population.
Tragedy of the Commons
A second political factor leading to shortsighted policymaking is the tragedy of the commons. According to this theory, political parties acting independently engage in excessive targeted government spending since they do not internalize the shared …nancing costs of government debt.
47
As an illustration, consider N symmetric parties that can make targeted de…cit-…nanced spending appropriations to their constituencies, simultaneously and without coordinating. Then each party fails to internalize the total cost of additional debt, since the burden of this debt is shared equally across parties in the future; the private cost of one additional unit of debt due to targeted spending is a fraction 1=N of the total 45 Arguments along these lines are made in Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) , Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), and Tabellini (1991) . Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) show that this present bias can be mitigated if current generations care more about future generations than future generations care about current generations.
46 See Parker (2012) and Wolter, et al. (2013) . 47 Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) discuss the common pool problem in a static …scal framework. Tornell and Lane (1999) , Velasco (1999 Velasco ( , 2000 , and Hertzberg (2016) discuss it in a dynamic framework where they show that it leads to lower aggregate saving.
cost. The result is excessive spending and government debt accumulation, which would be alleviated if parties jointly committed ex ante to limiting borrowing. In this sense, the lack of coordination leads the government to be present-biased and time-inconsistent in its …scal policy. 48 This coordination problem can also emerge across countries, particularly if these countries are highly integrated …nancially, as in the Euro area. Individual countries may fail to internalize the impact of their borrowing decisions on the shared interest rates, in ‡ation rates, or probability of …nancial contagion. The result is ine¢ ciently high public debt accumulation across countries.
49
The tragedy of the commons predicts that countries with a large number of constituencies or deep disagreements in spending priorities across constituencies will incur larger government de…cits, resulting in faster government debt accumulation.
50 This prediction is consistent with empirical work that has found that larger de…cits are associated with countries with more ministers, with greater ideological polarization in the executive, and with a proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) election system.
51
This theory can explain the long-term trend in government debt in advanced economies as a result of the increase in political polarization and fragmentation across advanced economies. Figure 6 displays the increase in partisan con ‡ict in the U.S. since the late 1960s. This trend is consistent with evidence from other advanced economies, which have witnessed a declining in ‡uence of centrist political parties; see Figure 7 .
52 Finally, across advanced economies, the rise in government debt has also mirrored the increase in political fractionalization in legislatures; see Figure 8 .
53 48 Under some assumptions on preferences, Hertzberg (2016) establishes an equivalence result which links the intertemporal behavior of multiple time-consistent agents su¤ering from the tragedy of the commons with that of a single time-inconsistent agent with quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
49 Chang (1990) , Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Quadrini (2014) , and Halac and Yared (2018a) discuss excessive borrowing in the context of shared interest rates. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) , Chari and Kehoe (2007) , and Aguiar, et al. (2015) discuss it in the context of shared in ‡ation rates. These mechanisms also apply to subnational governments which can issue their own debt (e.g., Dovis and Kirpalani, 2017) .
50 Disagreement in a common pool model can be represented by the weight individual constituencies place on targeted transfers versus mutually bene…cial public goods. See Hertzberg (2016) for additional details.
51 See for example evidence in Woo (2003) , Persson and Tabellini (2004) and Crivelli, et al. (2015) . 52 This pattern is principally driven by rising vote shares for far right political parties versus far left parties, which have maintained stable vote shares. See Betz (1994) and Ignazi (2003) for a discussion.
53 Figures 7, 8 , and 10 present data from Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016) starting from 1950 to maximize the cross-section of countries in the balanced panel. Relative to the sample in Figure 3 , the sample in these …gures excludes Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal, and Spain, for which this political data is not available for all years. 
Political Turnover
A large literature focuses on the third explanation for rising government debt: political turnover. 54 In contrast to the tragedy of the commons, the present bias in policymaking is not due to a lack of (intratemporal) coordination. Instead, present bias results from the interaction of two factors: the temporary concentration of political authority in one political party, which bene…ts disproportionately from current spending, and the inability of parties to make binding (intertemporal) commitments to one another. We can illustrate this idea with an example from the analysis of Aguiar and Amador (2011) . Suppose that there are N symmetric parties, each with a rate of time preference . For simplicity, suppose that only one party has the authority to make …scal policy decisions at any date. When a party is out of power, it puts a weight of 1 on the value of government spending, whereas when it is in power, it puts a weight of > 1 on the value of spending. The parameter captures the degree to which a party can derive additional bene…ts from spending while in power by boosting its popularity, concentrating spending on preferred initiatives, or increasing wasteful rents. The probability of any given party 54 For example, see Persson and Svensson (1989) , Alesina and Tabellini (1990) , Tabellini and Alesina (1990) , Lizzeri (1999) , Battaglini and Coate (2008) , Caballero and Yared (2010) , Yared (2010) , Bouton, Lizzeri, and Persico (2016) , and Müller, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2016), among others. having power at a given date is q = 1=N , which captures the degree of political risk for the incumbent party. When choosing policy at date t, an incumbent considers the probability of holding power in the future and hence weighs periods ft; t + 1; t + 2; :::g according to (e¤ective) discount rates ; (q + (1 q)) ; (q + (1 q)) 2 ; ::: . This formulation is mathematically equivalent to the quasi-hyberbolic case described at the beginning of this section, with a rate of time preference and de…cit bias = (q + (1 q)) = .
Conceptually, the presence of political turnover causes the current government to be impatient, since the party holding power recognizes that it may not have the opportunity to bene…t from spending in the future. 55 This present bias is more severe ( is lower) if the temporary bene…ts from spending and rent-seeking while in o¢ ce are large ( is high), if there are more parties competing for power (N is high), or if there is more political risk (q is low). 56 In addition to this present bias, government preferences are dynamically inconsistent; the party presently in power would prefer that future governments be …scally responsible, but future governments cannot commit ex ante to future policy. In this sense, the combination of lack of commitment together with political risk causes the government to be present-biased and time-inconsistent. This theory predicts that countries with more rent-seeking, political fragmentation, or political risk will incur larger government de…cits, resulting in faster government debt accumulation. These predictions are in line with empirical cross-country studies on the determinants of government de…cits.
57
This theory can explain the long-term trend in government debt in advanced economies as a result of rising political uncertainty for parties in power. Figure 9 shows that the margin of victory in U.S. presidential elections has been in decline since the mid-1980s, suggesting that elections have become closer and less predictable. This pattern is in line with the analysis of U.S. congressional elections, which has documented a declining incumbency advantage since the mid-1980s (e.g., Jacobson, 2015) . Moreover, this U.S. trend is consistent with the evidence from advanced economies in Figure 10 , which displays a decline in the average popular vote margin in legislative elections for the governing party 55 In this example, turnover is exogenous and probabilistic. However, the literature highlighted in Footnote 54 shows that the insight holds more generally if turnover is deterministic or if it is endogenous (and potentially o¤ the equilibrium path). In addition, Persson and Svensson (1989) and Müller, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2016) argue that the present bias may be more severe if the current party in power leans to the right and puts higher relative weight on tax cuts versus government spending increases. 56 Note that if a subset of parties can make decisions at any time (e.g., Battaglini and Coate, 2008) , then the number of parties and the degree of political risk are not mechanically related, as in this example. 57 In addition to the work cited in Footnote 51, see Drazen (2000) and Alt and Lassen (2016) who discuss the e¤ect of elections on de…cits. 
Assessment
In contrast with normative theories, political economy theories of government debt can qualitatively explain the long-term trend in government debt accumulation across advanced economies. Nevertheless, these theories leave several unanswered questions for future research.
First, it is unclear whether political economy models can quantitatively match the time-series and cross-sectional patterns in advanced economy government debt. Many normative models of government debt have been evaluated quantitatively, sometimes with counterfactual conclusions regarding the size and structure of government debt. 59 An analogous analysis of political economy models could potentially clarify what political factors can best account for the upward trend in government debt. Second, while political economy theories explain why an increase in polarization and electoral uncertainty can lead to rising debt, they do not explain why polarization and electoral uncertainty have increased in advanced economies, and how this development may have been caused by certain economic trends or policies. 60 Finally, current political economy theories do not directly address the change in the composition of government spending, which has become increasingly concentrated in old-age government assistance programs. This development could re ‡ect how di¤erent political forces interact in the world, as increasingly competititve political parties change the composition of government spending and increase government debt to appeal to an aging constituency.
4 Fiscal Rules to Constrain Rising Debt
A resonating theme across every political explanation for rising debt discussed in the previous section is the time-inconsistency in government preferences. Current governments want to be …scally irresponsible, while simultaneously hoping that future governments be …scally responsible. This force explains why governments across the world have been compelled to adopt …scal rules-such as mandated de…cit, spending, or revenue limits-to 59 For example, in their evaluation of the tax-smoothing model under incomplete markets, Aiyagari, et al. (2002) and Bhandari, et al. (2017a) …nd that the optimal level of government debt is negative. Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) evaluate the tax-smoothing model under complete markets and …nd that debt positions at di¤erent maturities can take opposite signs and be extremely large (in absolute value) relative to GDP.
60 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2008) , for example, argue that polarization and income inequality reinforce each other. 61 An additional question regards how the political factors behind present bias, such as polarization, interact with asymmetric information across political parties. Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that …scal stabilizations can be delayed when a one party is uncertain about the rival party's cost of high debt. restrict future …scal policy and curtail the increase in government debt. Figure 11 illustrates the growing number of countries that have imposed …scal rules. 62 These rules have been adopted at the subnational, national, and supranational levels. In some countries, such as in Switzerland, they have been an e¤ective force at limiting the government's de…cit bias and curbing the increase in debt, as Figure 12 makes clear.
63
Given their prevalence, an important question concerns the optimal structure of …scal rules, as well as the practical challenges in implementing them. In this section, I describe recent research on the optimal design of …scal rules, elucidating the fundamental tradeo¤ between commitment and ‡exibility underpinning these rules. I address what this tradeo¤ implies for various features of …scal rules in theory and in practice. This discussion touches on how rules should be conditioned on public information, how they should be enforced, how they should be applied at a supranational level, whether they should feature escape clauses, and whether they should be based on …scal policy tools or targets. Figure 11 . Number of Countries with Fiscal Rules 62 For a complete description of the …scal rule adopted in each country, see Lledó, et al. (2017) . The U.S. is currently subject to spending caps passed in the Budget Control Act of 2011 which were subsequently increased by Congress in 2013 Congress in , 2015 Congress in , and 2018 . A criticism of these spending caps is that they do not apply to most mandatory spending items underlying the growth in debt (see Capretta, 2014) .
63 See Salvi, Schaltegger, and Schmid (2017) for an analysis of the case of Switzerland and Wyplosz (2014) and Caselli et al. (2018) for a broader discussion of the e¤ectiveness of national and supranational rules at reducing debt. See Poterba (1994 Poterba ( , 1996 , Bohn and Inman (1996) , Fatás and Mihov (2006) , and Primo (2007) for an analysis of the e¤ectiveness of subnational rules in the U.S. See Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016) 
Commitment vs. Flexibility
In practice, tight …scal rules that successfully limit debt accumulation are associated with a less responsive and less volatile …scal policy. 64 This observation re ‡ects the fundamental tradeo¤ between commitment and ‡exibility underlying …scal rules. On the one hand, rules provide valuable commitment, as they can counteract the present bias in policymaking; on the other hand, there is a cost of reduced ‡exibility as …scal constitutions cannot spell out policy prescriptions for every single shock or contingency, and some discretion may be optimal.
65
There are two approaches to the theoretical analysis of this tradeo¤. The …rst approach restricts the structure of a …scal rule to a form used in practice-such as a de…cit limitand evaluates the stringency of an optimal rule (e.g., Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate, 2016, Halac and Yared, 2018a) . 66 The second approach does not restrict the structure of a …scal rule and uses mechanism design to simultaneously characterize the structure and the stringency of an optimal rule (e.g., Amador, Werning, and Angeletos, 2006 , and Halac and Yared, 2014 , 2017 , 2018b . This second approach distinguishes between …scally relevant information on which a …scal rule can explicitly depend-such as the level of public debt or GDP-and …scally relevant information on which a …scal rule cannot explicitly depend-such as the depth of a …nancial crisis or the wartime needs of the military. This latter type of information can be thought of as the government's private information, since it is payo¤ relevant but cannot be part of a rule's description.
67
An optimal …scal rule then is represented as a policy prescription that maximizes social welfare subject to the government's private information and present bias.
68
The advantage of the …rst approach is that it can be used to assess real world rules and evaluate the costs and bene…ts of partial reform in a framework that incorporates a rich set of macroeconomic and political forces. The advantage of the second approach is that it can be used to ask whether the overall structure of real world rules is optimal and to evaluate the costs and bene…ts of global-as opposed to partial-reform. This second approach also elucidates how other considerations, on top of private information and present bias, may contribute to the determination of an optimal rule, which can often take a simple, realistic form. These two approaches complement each other and provide useful lessons for the optimal design of …scal rules.
69
In the next subsections, I discuss what the tradeo¤ between commitment and ‡exibility implies for various features of …scal rules in theory and in practice.
Conditioning on Information
An optimal …scal rule conditions on …scally relevant information that is observable and veri…able, such as the level of debt and GDP. If no additional (private) information informs optimal …scal policy, the rule would take the form of a contingent policy prescription that a¤ords no discretion to policymakers. In practice, however, not all …scally relevant information can be easily observed and veri…ed, and some discretion may be bene…cial. A commitment-versus- ‡exibility tradeo¤ then arises, as discretion comes at the cost of 67 Formally, this private information may be publicly observable but not veri…able by a rule-making body. An alternative interpretation of the private information is that it represents the aggregation of individual citizens' preferences observable only to the government (e.g., Sleet 2004, Piguillem and Schneider, 2016) . Another interpretation is that the private information corresponds to …scally relevant data-such as the exact cost of public goods-which is only known to the government. 68 This approach is related to the study of delegation in principal-agent settings, including Holmström (1977 Holmström ( , 1984 , Melumad and Shibano (1991) , Alsonso and Matouschek (2008) , Amador and Bagwell (2013) , and Egorov (2013, 2017) , among others. The delegation problem concerns a principal who provides incentives to a better informed but biased agent by limiting the agent's actions (since transfers are infeasible). In contrast to the analysis of delegation, the analysis of …scal rules must address the dynamic inconsistency in the agent's (the government's) preferences. 69 The di¤erence between these two approaches is analogous to that between the Ramsey and Mirrlees approaches to optimal taxation. See Mankiw, Weinzerl, and Yagan (2009) for a discussion of this distinction.
excessive borrowing due to the government's present bias. Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006) show that, under some conditions, the optimal resolution of this tradeo¤ is a threshold rule, taking the form of a de…cit, spending, or revenue limit, as is often observed in practice. 70 The optimal threshold is tighter the smaller is the volatility of the government's private information and the more severe is the government's present bias, as in both cases the value of commitment is increased relative to the value of ‡exibility. There are important challenges in determining how to optimally set …scal thresholds. First, there are practical questions regarding implementation. Recent research has been devoted to examining which macroeconomic measures should be used to set a threshold, how to weigh the relative importance of these measures, and how to set the numerical targets so as to a¤ord su¢ cient ‡exibility while simultaneously preventing excessive debt growth.
71 Second, when some …scally relevant information is not veri…able, there are con-
ceptual questions regarding what other information an optimal …scal rule should condition on. In particular, Halac and Yared (2014) show that if the government's private information is persistent over time, an optimal …scal rule should condition on the extent to which past policies agreed with …scal targets, even if this measure is irrelevant for optimal policy determination. How to practically incorporate these considerations into real world …scal rules is an interesting area for future research.
Enforcement
According to the International Monetary Fund, governments comply with …scal rules only about 50 percent of the time. 72 Whenever a rule is violated, a formal or informal enforcement mechanism is triggered. For example, in the European Union, an Excessive De…cit Procedure-a sequence of costly …scal adjustments and potential sanctions-is set in motion whenever a rule is breached. 73 In contrast, in Chile, there are no formal procedures, and penalties for rule violation have been informal. In 2009, a breach of the …scal rule by the Chilean administration was informally punished by the next administration, which 70 This result requires certain assumptions on the distribution of private information and the government's preferences. Without these assumptions, an optimal rule is more complex and can involve multiple policy thresholds. 71 As an example, Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2016) analyze the short-and long-term costs and bene…ts of adopting a balanced budget amendment in the U.S. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2016) compare the performance of a debt-independent de…cit limit to a pure debt limit for the case of Brazil. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2017) argue that …scal rules should not be absolute and should respond ‡exibly to market signals such as sovereign spreads. See Eyraud, Baum, et al. (2018) for a general discussion of the challenges in calibrating …scal rules.
72 See Caselli et al. (2018) . 73 See Lledó, et al. (2017, p.81 ) for a description of this procedure.
continued to ignore the rule despite criticism of …scal irresponsibility. 74 This example highlights a self-enforcement mechanism: the threat of rule abandonment by future governments may serve as a deterrent for a current government considering breaking a …scal rule. How should …scal rules be structured under limited enforcement? Halac and Yared (2017) address this question in a commitment-versus- ‡exibility framework with limited punishments that harm both the government and society. They show that under some conditions, the optimal rule is a maximally-enforced threshold, namely a de…cit, spending, or revenue limit that triggers the largest feasible penalty whenever violated. A key insight is that, even though graduated punishments are less socially costly ex post, they are suboptimal ex ante as they induce too little …scal discipline.
75 Furthermore, this analysis
shows that …scal thresholds that are never violated by the government may be too lax and thus also suboptimal. This occurs when the government's present bias is severe and situations of extreme …scal need are rare. The …scal rule should then be tight enough as to be occasionally broken, since the social cost of infrequent punishment is outweighed by the bene…t of increased …scal discipline in normal times. There are several issues to take into account when considering punishments for breaking …scal rules. First, whether or not rules have been broken might be unclear due to lack of transparency. Governments can utilize creative accounting techniques to circumvent rules. For example, in 2016, President Dilma Rousse¤ of Brazil was impeached for illegally using state-run banks to directly pay for government expenses and bypass the …scal responsibility law.
76 Given this problem of transparency, many countries have established independent …scal councils to assess and monitor the implementation of …scal policy together with the compliance with …scal rules.
77
A second issue to consider is credibility. Non-credible punishments are ine¤ective to enforce …scal rules. As an example, the Excessive De…cit Procedure against France and Germany in 2003 was stalled because of disagreement between the European Commission and the European Council; consequently, French and German de…cits persisted without 74 See Halac and Yared (2017) for a description of this episode. 75 This insight relies on a technical result that incentives take a bang-bang form. In the model of Halac and Yared (2017) , this high-powered incentive structure is optimal since rewards and punishments are experienced jointly by the government and society.
76 See Leahy (2016) for a discussion. Another form of liability shifting in U.S. states has involved compensating government employees with future pension payments, which increases o¤-balance-sheet entitlement liabilities not subject to …scal rules (see Bouton, Lizzeri, and Persico, 2016) . Frankel and Schreger (2013) describe another example of creative accounting in the Euro area. They argue that governments utilize over-optimistic growth forecasts as a means of minimizing the burden of complying with …scal rules.
77 See Debrun et al. (2013) for an overview of these institutions.
penalty. 78 Halac and Yared (2017) argue that in the absence of institutionalized penalties, the temporary abandonment of rules combined with overspending-as in the Chilean case previously described-can serve as its own deterrent for breaking a …scal rule. Such an informal punishment is arguably easier to enforce than formal sanctions, as there is typically some constituency in favor of increasing spending.
79
A …nal issue to consider is the response of the private sector to a violation of rules, which can also serve as a form of punishment. For example, Caselli et al. (2018) …nd that the violation of …scal rules is associated with a signi…cant increase in sovereign spreads. Such an increase in …nancing costs immediately penalizes a government for breaching a rule. 
Coordinated Rules
More than half of the countries subject to …scal rules face rules that apply at a supranational level. Moreover, among these countries, more than a dozen have additional rules at the national level.
81 For example, Germany is constrained not only by the guidelines of the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), but also by its own constitutionally mandated "debt brake", which imposes a tighter limit on the government's structural de…cit than the SGP.
82
The main argument for imposing rules at a supranational level relates to the tragedy of the commons. Individual countries in an integrated economic region do not internalize the impact of their borrowing decisions on the shared interest rates, in ‡ation rates, or probability of …nancial contagion. Supranational …scal rules can limit this externality.
83
The adoption of supranational rules comes with numerous challenges. First, the imposition of uniform thresholds for multiple countries under a supranational rule, as in the case of the SGP, may be inappropriate if countries are likely to di¤er in the level or 78 See Tran (2003) for a discussion. 79 A similar mechanism underlies the incentive bene…t of formal institutions that make current spending increases automatically persist into the future (e.g., Bowen, Chen, and Eraslan, 2014, and Riboni, 2018) . 80 This idea can be formalized in a model of government debt and default which features multiple equilibria resulting from self-ful…lling market expectations (e.g., Calvo, 1988) . 81 The treaties that encompass the supranational rules correspond to the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact, the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. The countries with both national and supranational rules are all in the European Union.
82 See Truger and Will (2013) . 83 Halac and Yared (2018a) discuss the role of …scal rules in the context of shared interest rates. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) , Chari and Kehoe (2007) , and Aguiar et al. (2015) discuss them in the context of shared in ‡ation rates. volatility of their …scal needs or in the severity of their governments'present bias. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2017) argue that conditioning thresholds on market signals, like a sovereign interest spread, allows supranational rules to more e¤ectively tailor to individual countries.
Second, the design of rules at a supranational level must account for the disciplining e¤ect of interest rates (Halac and Yared, 2018a) . Excessively tight supranational rules not only reduce ‡exibility, but they promote …scal irresponsibility by reducing regional interest rates and governments'cost of funding. 84 In addition, countries that complement supranational rules with more stringent rules at the national level-as in the case of Germany in the European Union-exert an externality by driving down regional interest rates and reducing …scal discipline in other countries. Halac and Yared (2018a) show that in the face of such low interest rates, supranational rules must be made more stringent.
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Finally, whether supranational rules are easier or harder to enforce than national rules is an open theoretical and empirical question. On the one hand, supranational rules may be easier to enforce since the international economic system provides more tools for sanctioning, and the supranational sanctioning authority may be less subject to domestic political pressures. On the other hand, there is a collective action problem in the enforcement of supranational rules. Moreover, disagreement may be another impediment, as in the case described previously concerning the enforcement of the European Union's Excessive De…cit Procedure in 2003.
Escape Clauses
Many …scal rules feature an escape clause to allow the government to violate the rule under exceptional circumstances. Triggering an escape clause typically involves a costly review process, which culminates in a …nal decision by an independent …scal council, a legislature, or citizens via a referendum. In Switzerland, for example, the government can deviate from a …scal rule with a legislative supermajority in the cases of natural disaster, severe recession, or changes in accounting method.
86
84 Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos (2013) argue that the drop in interest rates that followed European integration led to the abandonment of reforms and institutional deterioration in the peripheral European countries.
85 This is because the ensuing international imbalances amplify the interest rate externality due to the tragedy of the commons. Halac and Yared (2018a) also show that if the disciplining e¤ect of interest rates is strong enough, supranational surplus limits which increase interest rates are optimal. This theoretical consideration can justify initiatives like the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure in the European Union, which limits current account surpluses (indirectly tied to budget surpluses) to 6 percent of GDP (see European Commission, 2016, Table 3 .2).
86 See Lledó, et al. (2017) for examples of countries with escape clause mechanisms.
Escape clauses function somewhat like the enforcement mechanisms described previously, since triggering them is costly and this deters governments from using them too frequently. However, in contrast to enforcement mechanisms, the costs here are directly related to the resources required for evaluation and deliberation. Moreover, since escape clauses facilitate information gathering to promote e¢ cient …scal policy, they are useful even in the presence of perfect rule enforcement. Coate and Milton (2017) and Halac and Yared (2016) study …scal rules that make use of escape clauses in a commitment-versus- ‡exibility framework.
87 They …nd that introducing escape clause provisions is optimal if (privately observed) …scal shocks are su¢ ciently volatile, the government's present bias is su¢ ciently severe, and the resource cost of triggering an escape clause is su¢ ciently low. In such a situation, a rule with an escape clause dominates a pure threshold rule by allowing for more ‡exibility in response to extreme economic conditions. In practice, the use of escape clause provisions can be challenging. The interpretation of events in which escape clauses can be triggered is subjective, and the political deliberation surrounding an appropriate …scal response can be uncertain and induce delay.
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Whether these costs can outweigh the bene…ts of using escape clauses is an open empirical question.
Instrument-Based and Target-Based Rules
How should …scal rules be applied? Should the government face constraints directly on instruments of policy, such as spending, or should the …scal rule concern targets of policy, such as de…cits? And which instruments and targets are the optimal ones to be addressed?
In practice, …scal rules can constrain di¤erent instruments of policy, such as government spending or tax rates, and can address speci…c categories of these instruments. For example, many countries have "golden rules", which limit spending net of a government's capital expenditure. Di¤erent instruments may call for di¤erent thresholds, as the associated commitment-versus- ‡exibility tradeo¤ may not be the same. 89 For instance, due to 87 Coate and Milton (2017) restrict attention to de…cit limits and model escape clauses as ex-post bargaining between a government and citizens. Halac and Yared (2016) do not impose an exogenous structure on …scal rules and model escape clauses as costly veri…cation of the government's private information.
88 See Primo (2007 for a discussion of the problems in implementing escape clauses in the …scal rules of U.S. states. 89 See Galperti (2018) for a theoretical exposition of this argument in the context of personal budgeting. In addition, having multiple layers of rules-for example on individual categories of spending and on overall spending-is optimal, particularly if there are complementarities from applying di¤erent …scal instruments. This reasoning can explain why a (forecasted) de…cit rule on top of a spending and tax rate volatile geopolitical conditions, military spending needs may be less forecastable ex ante than other spending needs, and may thus demand more ‡exibility. Capital spending is another category where allowing increased ‡exibility may be optimal, as the bene…ts of capital spending accrue well into the future and are thus subject to a less severe present bias. The evidence suggests that rules that distinguish across categories have indeed positive e¤ects on …scal and macroeconomic outcomes.
90
Similar principles apply to the analysis of target-based rules, which specify targets for outcomes of policy, such as the de…cit to GDP ratio. Target-based rules di¤er from instrument-based rules in two respects. 91 First, a target-based rule more directly ties a government's incentives to economic goals, while giving the government greater instrument discretion to respond to changing macroeconomic conditions. Second, given the risk of macroeconomic surprises, a government may be penalized for rule breach despite its best e¤orts to choose instruments to satisfy the target. Therefore, an optimal target threshold should be tight enough that it induces the government to rein in its present bias through its choice of instruments, but not so tight that it is excessively prone to violations due to macroeconomic surprises. Halac and Yared (2018b) develop a theoretical framework to compare these di¤erent classes of rules. They show that target-based rules dominate instrument-based rules if the government is su¢ ciently well informed, so that instrument discretion is bene…cial and punishment due to macroeconomic surprises is relatively unlikely. Bohn and Inman (1996) analyze …scal rules of U.S. states and …nd that target-based rules, in the form of end-of-the-year …scal requirements, perform better than instrument-based rules, in the form of beginning-of-the-year …scal requirements. Finally, Halac and Yared (2018b) show theoretically how a simple hybrid rule-which allows for an instrument threshold that is relaxed whenever a target threshold is satis…ed-would do better than either class.
Concluding Remarks
Over the past four decades, government debt as a fraction of GDP has been on an upward trajectory in advanced economies, approaching levels not reached since World War II. While normative macroeconomic theories can explain the increase in the level of debt rule can be optimal.
90 Bassetto and Sargent (2006) address the bene…ts of a "golden rule" in a calibrated theoretical model, and Poterba (1995) assesses the rule's impact in the context of U.S. states. See Eyraud, Lledó, et al. (2018) for an additional discussion of issues to consider in rule selection. 91 Halac and Yared (2018b) formalize these di¤erent rule classes in an extended delegation framework that incorporates a noisy observable outcome.
in certain periods as a response to macroeconomic shocks, they cannot explain the broadbased long-run trend in debt accumulation. In contrast, political economy theories can explain the long-run trend as resulting from an aging population, rising political polarization, and rising electoral uncertainty across advanced economies.
Political economy theories emphasize the time-inconsistency in government policymaking, and thus the need for …scal rules that restrict policymakers. Many countries have adopted …scal rules to rein in growing debts. Most of these rules were recently introduced, and time will tell whether they lead to sustainable government …nances and to a reversal of a decades-old trend. Their success depends, in part, on whether they appropriately balance the tradeo¤ between commitment and ‡exibility underpinning these rules, and whether they address other challenges that I have highlighted, such as enforceability.
This discussion leaves us with several interesting questions for future research. First, while I have focused on …scal rules as a solution to growing debts, in practice, the introduction of …scal rules should be combined with additional reforms to budgetary procedures. How speci…c procedural rules, such as voting or amendment rules, complement or thwart the e¤ect of …scal rules is an important issue to consider. 92 Second, a government's de…cit bias is not constant, since it evolves over time in response to factors such as changing polarization and electoral uncertainty. Understanding how these underlying political forces are impacted by …scal policy and by the introduction of …scal rules is important for governments contemplating rule adoption. Finally, the introduction and implementation of …scal rules requires a level of political consensus and stability, which is likely to emerge during a period of responsible policymaking, when the bene…t of rules is less salient. How to take advantage of such an occasion to adopt and improve …scal rules, rather than letting it pass as a missed opportunity, is critical for limiting the growth of government debt.
